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Functionalism 
 
The term functionalism has been used in at least three different senses in the social 
sciences. In the philosophy of mind, functionalism is a view about the nature of mental 
states. In sociology and anthropology, functionalism is an approach to understanding 
social processes in terms of their contribution to the operation of a social system. In 
psychology, functionalism was an approach to mental phenomena which emphasized 
mental processes as opposed to static mental structures.  
 
Functionalism in the Philosophy of Mind 
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind was first systematically developed in the 
1960s as a view about the nature of mental states such as sensations, beliefs, desires, and 
emotions. It arose in response to questions about the relation between mind and body, in 
the context of a debate between opposed views known as dualism and materialism. 
Dualism was defended by the seventeenth-century philosopher René Descartes, who held 
that minds were nonphysical substances which were not located in space and indeed had 
no physical properties at all. A major difficulty for dualists has been to explain how 
mental states, if they have no physical properties, can cause or be caused by physical 
states of a person’s body. Materialists, by contrast, have held that there are no 
nonphysical substances, and that mental states are nothing more than physical states.  
The best-known materialist views in the 1950s were behaviorism and the identity 
theory. Behaviorism as a theory of the nature of mental states is sometimes called logical 
behaviorism to distinguish it from behaviorism as a methodological view in psychology. 
According to behaviorism, mental states were simply tendencies to behave in certain 
ways under certain circumstances. Behaviorists thus rejected not only dualism, but also 
the common-sense view that mental states are internal states that are causes of behavior. 
Identity theorists, on the other hand, held that mental states were identical with states of 
the central nervous system. The identity theory appeared to rule out by definition the 
possibility that mental states could be present in any being that did not have a human 
central nervous system. 
Functionalism was intended to be a theory that was compatible with materialism, 
while avoiding the difficulties of behaviorism and the identity theory. It was motivated in 
part by the thought that the relation between mind and body is analogous to the relation 
between software and hardware in a computer. Computational states are defined, not in 
terms of specific hardware configurations, but in terms of their relations to inputs, 
outputs, and other computational states. Computational states are multiply realizable; that 
is, they can be realized or implemented by a wide range of different kinds of hardware. 
Functionalists held that a similar approach could be taken to mental states, i.e. that mental 
states could be defined as relations between perceptual inputs, behavioral outputs, and 
other functional states. For example, the beginnings of a functionalist analysis of pain 
might point out that it is a state which is produced by potentially harmful sensory inputs, 
leads to avoidance behaviors, and tends to produce such other mental states as a dislike 
for whatever caused the pain. According to the functionalist, it is relationships such as 
these, not a specific physical implementation, that are essential to pain. 
Functionalism seems to avoid the difficulties of the other main approaches to the 
nature of mental states. Because mental states, like computational states, must be 
implemented in a physical medium, functionalism seems to make it less mysterious than 
dualism how mental states can stand in causal relations with physical states of the body. 
Unlike behaviorism, functionalism is compatible with the view that mental states are 
internal causes of behavior. And unlike the identity theory, functionalism leaves open the 
possibility that beings very unlike humans could nevertheless have mental states. 
Different versions of functionalism have been developed by different writers. The 
view described above most closely resembles the “machine functionalism” defended by 
Hilary Putnam in a number of papers reprinted in his Mind, Language, and Reality 
(1975). Somewhat different versions were defended by other writers; David Braddon-
Mitchell and Frank Jackson offer a useful survey in their Philosophy of Mind and 
Cognition (1996), and a number of the original papers are reprinted in Ned Block, ed., 
Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2 (1980).  
The most serious difficulty for functionalism is the problem of accounting for 
conscious experiences, which philosophers call qualia. One thought experiment which 
illustrates the problem involves the apparent  possibility of “inverted qualia.” It seems 
possible in principle that two people could be functionally identical even though their 
experiences were inverted, so that when one person saw something green, that person had 
an experience that felt to him or her the way an experience of something red felt to the 
other. If this is a real possibility, it follows that functionalism cannot be a complete 
account of the nature of all mental states, since if two people with identical functional 
properties could nevertheless have different qualia, then qualia cannot be functional 
states.  
 
Functionalism in Sociology and Anthropology 
In sociology, functionalism was a theoretical perspective that emphasized that the 
parts of a social system are interrelated in such a way that none of them can be fully 
understood except in terms of its effects on the others. The relationships between the 
parts of a social system constitute the structures of that system, and these structures are to 
be explained in terms of their functions, i.e. their contributions to the continued stable 
existence of the system. The social systems to which functional analysis was applied 
ranged from units as small as the family to those as large as international organizations; 
the structures to which functions were imputed included social roles, social norms, 
devices for social control, and many others. 
Functionalism originated in the late nineteenth century in the work of such thinkers 
as Herbert Spencer and Emile Durkheim; it was developed in the early twentieth century 
as an approach to anthropology by A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw Malinowski; 
and in the middle decades of the twentieth century, as elaborated by Talcott Parsons and 
Robert Merton, it became the dominant perspective in American sociology.  
Some functionalist writers were influenced by an analogy between societies and 
biological organisms, and their concept of social function was explicitly modeled on that 
of biological function. Radcliffe-Brown, for instance, in “Structure and Function in 
Primitive Society” (1935, reprinted in Coser and Rosenberg, Sociological Theory, 1976), 
distinguishes between three sets of sociological problems: “social morphology,” which 
will identify social structures just as biological morphology identifies organic structures; 
“social physiology,” which identifies the functions of these structures; and 
“development,” which will study how new social structures arise, much as evolutionary 
theory explains the development of new kinds of organisms.  
Functionalists have typically thought of the function of a social activity as its 
contribution to the needs of the society, especially to a social equilibrium which tends to 
right itself if disturbed. Durkheim, in the first systematic development of a functionalist 
approach, distinguished between the cause of an activity such as the punishment of crime, 
on the one hand, and its function, on the other. The practice of punishment may initially 
be caused by an intention to deter crime or achieve justice, but its function, according to 
Durkheim, is to maintain our intense emotional disapproval of crime. Although a 
particular practice or activity may not initially be caused by a recognition of the function 
it will serve, Durkheim holds that its serving a useful function is nevertheless part of the 
explanation of the continued survival of that practice. 
The sociologists most closely associated with functionalism in the mid-twentieth 
century were Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton. Parsons identified four functions which 
any social system needs in order to achieve and maintain equilibrium. These were 
adaptation, or the acquisition and distribution of resources from the environment; goal 
attainment, which involves determining which goals of the system have priority and 
determining how to achieve them; integration, which involves coordinating relationships 
between various social actors to enable them to function smoothly together; and “latent 
pattern maintenance-tension management,” which involves transmitting values which 
will keep actors motivated to act in ways that are necessary for the continued functioning 
of the system. 
Merton’s contributions included his distinction between manifest functions, which 
are consequences that agents in the system recognize and intend to produce, and latent 
functions, which are not intended or recognized. Whereas Parsons had tended to 
emphasize manifest functions, Merton stressed that many important functions are latent. 
Merton also introduced the concept of dysfunctions, which are consequences of an 
activity that have negative effect on the stability of the system. 
By the 1980s, functionalism was no longer the dominant paradigm in sociology, in 
part because of the perceived conservatism of its emphasis on equilibrium, and its 
consequent lack of attention to social conflict and change, and in part because it was seen 
more as a set of abstract categories than as a testable empirical theory. 
 
Functionalism in Psychology 
In psychology, the term functionalism refers to an American school of psychology that 
was influential at the turn of the nineteenth century. Functionalism developed in response 
to the earlier structuralist view advanced by Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) and Edward B. 
Titchener (1867–1927). Structuralist psychology used an introspectionist methodology to 
attempt to identify basic elements of conscious experience into which more complex 
experiences, or structures, could be analyzed. Functionalism, by contrast, emphasized 
psychological processes rather than static psychological structures. Functionalism also 
stressed the role of the mind as a mediator between the environment and the needs of the 
organism; like the pragmatist philosophy that influenced it, functionalism held that 
psychological processes should be understood in terms of their effects. The most 
influential contributors to this school were the pragmatist philosophers William James 
(1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859–1952), and the University of Chicago psychologist 
James Rowland Angell (1869–1949). Although functionalism influenced later approaches 
to psychology, as a distinct school it faded from view in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, as behaviorism rose to prominence. 
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